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Is Turkey’s EU accession process grinding to a halt? 
Did open opposition to Turkish membership by some 
European leaders cause the slow-down of Turkey’s 
reform process in recent years, or was it the Ankara 
government’s lack of resolve? Is there a danger of 
“creeping Islamisation” in Turkish society? What are 
the chances for solving the Kurdish question, the 
Cyprus problem and the differences with Armenia? 
Can Turkey’s important new geo-political role in the 
region be an asset for the European Union?
These and other questions are answered in this 
report of the Independent Commission on Turkey. 
The Independent Commission was established by 
prominent European politicians for the purpose 
of analysing some of the most pressing aspects of 
Turkey’s accession to the EU. Its first report Turkey 
in Europe: More than a Promise? was issued in 
September 2004.
Members of the Independent Commission on Turkey would like to thank the 
Open Society Foundation and the British Council for their support to this report.
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The Independent Commission on Turkey was established in March 
2004 by a group of concerned Europeans, deeply committed to 
the integration process and having held high public office, for the 
purpose of contributing to a more objective and rational debate on 
Turkey’s accession to the European Union.
 In its first report, Turkey in Europe: More than a Promise?, 
published in September 2004, the Independent Commission 
examined the long history of Turkey’s convergence with Europe 
as well as the major opportunities and challenges connected with 
Turkey’s possible EU membership. It concluded that accession 
negotiations should be opened without delay upon fulfilment by 
Turkey of the Copenhagen Criteria. Turkey’s European vocation 
and its eligibility for membership in the EU having been re-
confirmed by European governments many times during past 
decades, any further delay would have been seen as a blatant breach 
of commitments made and would have seriously damaged the 
Union’s credibility. Moreover, while the accession of a country with 
the size and specific characteristics of Turkey would doubtlessly 
present the EU with substantive challenges, it argued that these 
were by no means insurmountable. On the other hand, the 
accession of a transformed, democratic and modern Turkey, a 
country in a unique geo–strategic position with great economic 
potential and a young and dynamic workforce, would bring 
considerable benefits to the European Union.
 The Independent Commission welcomed the European 
Council decision in December 2004 to open accession negotiations 
with Turkey and the start of talks in October 2005. Regrettably, 
negative reactions since then from European political leaders 
and growing hesitation by the European public about further 
enlargement, have given Turkey the impression that it is not 
welcome, even if it were to fulfil all membership conditions. 
Moreover, the process itself has been hindered by the effective 
blockage of more than half of the negotiating chapters. 
 Support in Turkey has faded for both the EU accession process 
and the implementation of difficult and sometimes expensive 
reforms. This was aggravated by internal political difficulties, in 
which the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) found itself 
under serious pressure from emboldened Turkish Euro-sceptics 
who, partly under the guise of defending secular 
principles against a supposed advance of Islamism, 
attempted to delay the implementation of political 
and social reforms needed for EU membership. 
Lack of Turkish reforms triggered more European 
opposition to Turkey’s accession. The sense of being excluded further 
demoralized Turkish reformers, thus creating a vicious circle. 
 This vicious circle is now undermining the many achievements 
over the past decade inspired by Turkey’s convergence with the EU. 
In particular, progress has stalled in strengthening democracy, 
broadening respect for human rights and building up a free and 
vibrant civil society. The new dynamism experienced by the 
Turkish economy has slowed, aggravated by the global economic 
crisis, as has the dramatic increase of foreign direct investment 
experienced after the talks started. On the other hand, Turkey’s 
new charisma and prosperity have made it increasingly attractive 
to nearby countries and its proactive regional policy has proved 
that an EU-anchored Turkey can project stability into volatile 
areas of its neighbourhood in the Caucasus and Middle East. This 
is the backdrop of the present report, in which the Independent 
Commission analyses developments in the EU and Turkey since 
the opening of negotiations as well as issues important for Turkey’s 
accession process.
 As with its first report in 2004, the present publication by 
the Independent Commission represents the personal views 
of its members, and does not intend to duplicate the European 
Commission’s forthcoming annual progress report. 
 Finally, it is with great sadness that the Independent 
Commission on Turkey records the untimely death in 2008 of its 
fellow commission member Bronisław Geremek, former Foreign 
Minister of Poland, whose valuable contribution to the work of the 
Independent Commission was highly appreciated.
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In December 2004, the European Council, comprising the heads of 
state or government of all EU member states, decided unanimously 
to start accession negotiations with Turkey. This unambiguous 
decision was fully in line with repeated affirmations made over 
many decades of Turkey’s eligibility and its future welcome as 
a member, as soon as it fulfilled the required conditions. The 
decision was firmly approved the same month 
in the European Parliament, with 407 Members 
voting in favour and 262 against. Already in 1999, 
the European Council had declared that Turkey 
should be treated like any other candidate state. 
Turkey therefore had every reason to expect that this process would 
be conducted in the same manner as previous enlargement rounds, 
and that its duration and outcome primarily depended on Turkey’s 
fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria, adoption of the body of EU 
law and other conditions of accession.
 Unfortunately, within months Turkey was confronted with 
statements by European leaders that undermined this unanimous 
decision, as well as negative actions by EU member states to block 
the talks. These attempted to overturn the agreed course and 
fundamental nature of the negotiations. In several countries, such 
public discourse coincided with elections, giving the impression 
that domestic political calculations were involved. Attacks on the 
EU-Turkey process became a proxy for popular concerns about 
immigration, worries about jobs, fears of Islam and a general 
dissatisfaction with the EU. Some politicians argued that Turkey 
is intrinsically un-European, that even if Turkey fulfilled all 
conditions it should not join the EU and that Turkish accession 
would flood Europe with Turkish migrants. Through language 
conjuring up a uniquely Turkish threat to the EU, attempts were 
made to blame Turkey’s EU accession process for difficulties within 
the Union and making it seem as though an eventual Turkish 
accession would render the Union unmanageable.
 This public rhetoric was backed up by efforts to re-interpret 
the Negotiating Framework formally agreed by all governments, 
on the basis of which Turkey started negotiations on EU 
membership in October 2005. The framework clearly stated that 
“the shared objective of the negotiations is accession.” However, 
some leaders took the sentence that followed – “these negotiations 
are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be 
guaranteed beforehand” – to mean that EU-Turkey negotiations 
could also be aiming at several alternative possibilities other  
than membership.
 A few governments began arguing in favour of a “privileged 
partnership” or “special relationship” instead of the treaty-based 
prospect of membership held out to Turkey for decades. None 
of the proponents of this formula, however, have succeeded in 
explaining what additional privileges or partnership might be 
on offer for Turkey, the non-EU state with the oldest and closest 
relationship with Brussels, including an Association Agreement in 
1963 and a Customs Union since 1996. Moreover, NATO-member 
Turkey is already broadly integrated into almost all pan-European 
institutions, from the Council of Europe, including the European 
Court of Human Rights, and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe to football leagues. Indeed, advocacy of 
“privileged partnership” appears to be a populist excuse to deny 
Turkey access to EU political mechanisms, even though Turkey is 
already bound by many EU political decisions in which it has  
had no say.
 These negative attitudes and policies of European leaders 
are in clear contradiction to all previous EU decisions and 
commitments. They put in question EU credibility, reliability 
and the principle of pacta sunt servanda, that agreements are to be 
honoured. As in any negotiation, the EU-Turkey accession process 
is by definition open-ended, and may not be concluded if either 
side is not satisfied with the end result. Undermining these talks 
in advance by substituting alternative arrangements for the goal 
of membership constitutes a breach of faith with Turkey, stokes 
up a nationalist backlash in the country and creates the wider 
impression that the EU has discriminatory double standards 
when dealing with a Muslim country. In any event, the process 
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alone – adopting the EU acquis communautaire with thousands 
of regulations – would make much less sense if it was geared 
towards anything short of membership. High-level European 
talk of a “privileged partnership” lacking substance thus works 
against the key EU goal of building up its soft power beyond its 
current borders, a process that is visibly promoted through Turkish 
adoption of EU rules, values and political standards. 
 Just as damagingly, formal and informal actions by some EU 
member states have targeted the negotiating process itself. More 
than half of the 35 negotiating chapters are blocked, either formally 
because of Turkey’s failure to implement the 
Ankara Protocol, or informally by one or more 
member states. Nearly a dozen chapters are 
frozen in connection with the Cyprus problem, 
including eight chapters formally blocked 
by the December 2006 European Council. France has publicly 
declared that it will not allow five key areas of the negotiations to 
go forward, specifically because the current French leadership 
opposes Turkish accession and believes Ankara should be offered 
“partnership, not integration”. There are informal blocks on 
other chapters and eleven chapters are held up in the Council by 
member states for political reasons. Paradoxically – given the fact 
that Turkey aligned itself with 109 of 124 EU joint statements, 
declarations and demarches in 2008 and participates in important 
EU missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo – the blocked 
chapters include three of the most important and promising areas 
for joint EU-Turkish action, namely External Relations; Energy; 
and Foreign, Security and Defence Policy. 
Other indirect efforts to derail Turkey’s EU membership goal have 
included the suggestions that the definitive borders of Europe 
be drawn by a “group of wise men”, and that a Union for the 
Mediterranean should be established. Turkey was not mentioned 
in these proposals, but was widely seen as the target. Due to timely 
intervention by member states in favour of a Turkey integrated into 
the EU, the mandates for these initiatives were then formulated 
in such a broad manner that they have had little real impact on 
Turkey’s European ambitions.
 Politicians who oppose Turkish membership of the EU 
have nonetheless succeeded in diluting the spirit of the Helsinki 
European Council of 1999, which, in a watershed decision, declared 
that “Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the 
basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States.” 
Since then, the bar for accession has been raised steadily higher 
than for previous candidates. Psychologically, this has been one 
of the most de-motivating aspects of EU conduct, especially when 
Turks felt that the Europeans had prioritized former Soviet-bloc 
states over their long-standing NATO ally, and were disregarding 
Turkey’s arguably stronger performance in governance and 
economic and social indicators.
 European politicians who aim to deny Turkey access to the 
EU often seem to follow attitudes in their respective countries 
as reflected in opinion polls – an incomplete way of deciding the 
future of a complex EU-Turkey accession process that will take 
another decade or more. European public opinion in turn tends 
to follow the views expressed by political leaders. There is a clear 
correlation between falls in support for Turkey’s EU membership 
and high-levels of anti-Turkey speech-making in some countries. 
In other states, where leaders have articulated the benefits of the 
EU-Turkey process, support for Turkish accession has remained 
higher. It is obvious that many Europeans are in two minds about 
Turkey’s future with the European Union. Much of the confusion 
results from a lack of clear information, and an assumption 
that accession or aspects of it are imminent. In fact, some of the 
Europeans’ greatest concerns – free movement of Turkish labour, 
agricultural subsidies and structural funds – have already been 
made subject to possible permanent derogations. The more open 
debate there is on these matters, the better. After all, back in 1954, 
51% of French people told pollsters that they had a negative view 
of the German people and only 29% thought a Franco-German 
alliance would work.
 In Turkey, media and politicians have tended to focus 
on antagonistic messages from Europe and to disregard the 
considerable support for Turkey’s EU membership in many 
European countries. This has contributed to a backlash in Turkey, 
resulting in resentment against Europeans in general, a helpless 
feeling that Turkey will never be accepted as an EU member 
and a decline in support for EU accession. In autumn 2008, 
Eurobarometer found that Turks stating that membership would 
be a good thing fell to 42%, down from well over 70% in 2004. Lack 
of faith in a positive outcome of the accession process de-motivates 
Turkish leaders and means the population puts less pressure on 
them to carry out the necessary reforms, which in turn feeds the 
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arguments of Turkey-sceptics in the EU. The EU is losing leverage 
in Turkey, just as Turkey is becoming a real regional power.
 The Independent Commission on Turkey is of the view 
that the European Union, in the interest of its credibility, must 
respect its own decisions and firmly stand behind commitments 
it has made. European leaders should break the vicious circle that 
has resulted from the reversal of European 
attitudes, a reversal for which they are 
partly responsible. It was the positive lead 
from Europe in 1999 that encouraged an 
unprecedented wave of reforms in Turkey and 
this sense of EU leadership can be resurrected. 
Few of the 27 governments in the EU are currently clearly against 
eventual Turkish accession, and a majority of EU governments 
support it, some strongly. Turkey has been an associate member of 
the EU for almost fifty years, is an important and respected partner 
in European and transatlantic organizations, straddles a vital 
geo-strategic crossroads and deserves to be treated with fairness 
by its European partners. As the European Council stated in 2004, 
the goal of the negotiating process is accession, and it cannot be 
anything else. Whether that goal can be reached will depend on the 
outcome of negotiations, the transformation of Turkey, and, at the 
end of the talks, on decisions by Turkey and the EU member states. 
Turkey-EU convergence is a positive process that has done much 
evident good for both sides and it is this virtuous circle that must 
be re-established.
II   Turkey’s missed 
opportunities for reform
The sweeping reforms in Turkey that followed the EU’s 1999 
recognition of Turkey as a candidate state count as one of the 
most impressive transformations in the country’s history, and 
bear comparison to the adoption of European laws in the 1920s 
under republican founder Kemal Atatürk. The 2000-2005 golden 
age of reform produced eight legal reform packages to comply 
with Copenhagen Criteria and harmonize Turkish legislation 
with the EU acquis communautaire. These changes rewrote one 
third of the constitution, enacted international human rights 
legislation, abolished the death penalty, improved women’s rights, 
brought new safeguards against torture and ushered in reform 
of the prison system. New laws curtailed formerly draconian 
restrictions on freedom of expression, association and the media. 
The Turkish armed forces stepped further back from their once-
dominant role, accepting more transparent defence budgets, the 
reduction of National Security Council powers and the end of 
state security courts. A sense that Turkey was now part of a real 
European project made the country feel more secure, alleviating 
the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, encouraging a more open debate 
about the Armenian question and reducing incidents of militant 
violence. The new confidence anchored six years of 7% economic 
growth and an unprecedented wave of foreign investment. Outside 
Turkey, this partnership with the EU encouraged Ankara to make 
strong contributions to international peacekeeping missions and 
to sponsor a chance to settle the frozen Cyprus conflict.
 Ironically, the dramatic slow-down of this reform era can be 
dated to the start of accession negotiations in October 2005. There 
are a number of reasons for this unexpected development. On one 
hand, blame can be laid on the negative attitudes of some European 
leaders, confusion in Europe about constitutional arrangements 
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and further enlargement, and the increasing obstacles that arose 
in the negotiating process, as described in the previous chapter. 
On the other hand, the AKP government missed opportunities 
and failed to sustain the momentum of reforms before it was 
challenged by a plethora of domestic distractions. 
 From 2007 onwards, the ruling AKP had to fight off multiple 
challenges from an ad hoc coalition of old guard opponents 
including the military, parts of the judiciary and the main 
opposition Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP). These attacks were 
based on the allegation that AKP was acting against the secular 
principles of the republic. They included an April 2007 warning by 
the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces that it might “openly 
display its reaction” and a March 2008 demand by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s chief prosecutor for the closure of AKP and the 
banning from politics of 71 politicians, including 
President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Another disruption was 
the discovery in 2007 of arms caches that seemed 
to be part of a plot to topple the government, 
the Ergenekon conspiracy. Although the prosecutors appear 
to have had every reason to pursue the Ergenekon case, further 
controversy resulted from more than 100 subsequent arrests and 
investigations of high military officers and establishment figures. 
The government’s freedom to enact reforms for ethnic Kurds in 
the post-2005 period was also limited by renewed clashes between 
the Turkish military and militants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK), recognized as a terrorist group by the EU and many others.
 Such internal ferment led to a regrettable slow-down in 
the reform process. While this political drama has largely 
been seen as a sign of political instability, it in fact included the 
steps necessary for Turkey to become a more open society. The 
Independent Commission is convinced of the need for Turkish 
re-engagement with a number of important projects to bring 
itself into line with European norms. First among these should 
be a broad-based process leading to a new constitution to replace 
the restrictive document drawn up under military rule in 1982. A 
new constitution is not a requirement to join the EU, but drawing 
up one would both remove obstacles to other vital reforms and 
also make a clear statement of Turkey’s intent to become a truly 
democratic society and a modern EU state. The opposition 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) and National Action Party 
(MHP) should demonstrate their stated support for Turkey’s  
EU ambitions by working in good faith with AKP on such a new 
basic document.
 To conform with EU law, Turkey must push ahead with 
passing legislation to establish a functioning ombudsman, an 
institution which, in another sign of Turkey’s long European 
interaction, is originally an Ottoman idea adopted by a passing 
Swedish king three centuries ago. It must 
also adopt EU standards on procurement as 
another step to full transparency and reducing 
corruption in government, one of the main 
reasons ordinary Turks support the EU accession 
process. Freedoms of organization, equal 
rights in education and access to seminaries must be extended 
to all religious faiths. Freedom of expression must be secured by 
convinced public support for free speech from political leaders, 
by narrowing the definition of terrorism in the Anti-Terror Law 
and ensuring European standards in the interpretation and 
implementation of restrictive regulations by the courts and 
security services. In April 2008, Turkey made it harder to open 
cases against dissidents and intellectuals under controversial 
Penal Code Article 301 and changed its wording to make it less 
unacceptable to liberal and international opinion, but even in its 
amended form it appears open to abuse. A new Political Parties 
Law is also vital to strengthen intra-party democracy, encourage 
youth to enter mainstream politics, bring transparency to party 
financing and end a system in which party leaders are too easily 
able to crush dissent. The military has withdrawn further from 
politics since 47% Turks voted for AKP in July 2007, three months 
after the army published a threat to the government on its website, 
but it must do more to be non-partisan, for instance by ending the 
practice of lengthy public political speeches by senior generals.
  If Turkey wants to align fully with European democracies 
it must recommit to the transformation process and shed 
authoritarian legacies and an outdated hostility to external 
influences. Turkish leaders must do their part to speed up the 
tempo of efforts to adopt the EU acquis communautaire, a rhythm 
in which the two sides have mostly opened two negotiating 
chapters in each six-month EU presidency. 
 The Independent Commission is encouraged by the re-launch 
of the reform efforts in December 2008, when, after more than four 
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The Cyprus problem is approaching a new and critical crossroads. 
After five years in limbo following the Republic of Cyprus’s entry 
into the EU, developments over the next year will likely determine 
whether or not the island will be indefinitely divided. The EU 
member states bear a political responsibility for the current 
situation. It also faces a political imperative to do its utmost to 
encourage Greek and Turkish Cypriots to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion to the ongoing talks, which look like the last chance 
for a federal settlement. The difficulty of reaching this objective 
is small compared to the likely complications of failure. EU 
governments will be caught between loyalty to a 
member state and their important strategic interests 
in Turkey. Failure in the talks will mean further 
hindrance of cooperation between the EU and 
NATO because of Cyprus-Turkey differences, and 
continued blockage in opening more chapters that could bring 
the EU-Turkey negotiations to a standstill. Cyprus has remained 
peaceful for decades, but the EU has unfastened the balances of the 
old status quo and, with tens of thousands of troops on the island, 
this is a conflict that might unfreeze.
 The EU brought this problem upon itself by accepting 
Cyprus’s one million inhabitants into the Union even though they 
had yet to resolve their inter-communal differences. It has thus 
imported the whole tangled history of the island into its inner 
councils. The troubles started in earnest after independence from 
Britain in 1960, when the 80% Greek Cypriot community and 20% 
Turkish Cypriot community set up a joint republic, guaranteed 
by Britain, Greece and Turkey. The republic broke down in 1963, 
when the Greek Cypriots excluded Turkish Cypriot leaders from 
government and drove the Turkish Cypriots into barricaded 
years’ delay, Turkey enacted a new National Programme that sets 
out a formal legislative road-map. In January 2009, it appointed 
a first full-time EU negotiator, State Minister Egemen Bağış. In 
the same month the government introduced a Kurdish-language 
state television channel, serious discussion of Kurdish institutes 
in universities and new steps to include the concerns of the Alevi 
faith alongside mainstream Sunni Islam in religious education 
and other official domains. The government has announced 
plans for a new round of constitutional and legal reforms, notably 
trying to find a way to spread parliamentary representation to 
smaller political parties. In July 2009, Turkey further restricted 
the jurisdiction of military courts with new legislation enabling 
civilian courts to prosecute military personnel for non-military 
offences. Prime Minister Erdoğan made his first trip to Brussels in 
four years, soon followed by President Gül, the first Turkish head of 
state to visit the seat of the EU. Opposition leader Deniz Baykal also 
made a journey to Brussels. 
 The Independent Commission is convinced that 
comprehensive, consistent and sustained progress towards more 
democracy at home is the best way to persuade more Europeans of 
Turkey’s EU compatibility. The government now has two years free 
of elections in which to focus on the EU convergence process as an 
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communities and leaderships on both sides of the island, to raise 
their morale and attract positive popular attention to the process; 
by sponsoring eye-catching bi-communal projects and interaction 
between two communities that can rekindle enthusiasm for 
reunification; by regular visits to Ankara to underline that Turkey 
is on track to membership of the EU and that continuation of its 
existing support for a Cyprus settlement will 
help it reach the EU goal; and by persuading 
Greece to use its influence to intercede with 
the Greek Cypriot community, explaining the 
benefits of compromise and normalization with Turkey. EU leaders 
should also make clear how wrong the Republic of Cyprus and 
Turkey both are to believe that pressure from Brussels alone can 
force changes in the other’s antagonistic positions. For a Cyprus 
settlement to gain traction, officials from the Republic of Cyprus 
and Turkey will also have to meet and learn to trust each other.
 Failure to reach a settlement this year will be costly to all 
sides. EU leaders must challenge the apparent view in both Cypriot 
communities that the status quo is sustainable indefinitely and 
show that peace through compromise can bring many benefits. 
Turkish Cypriots will win full citizenship rights and integration 
into the EU, with all the economic and political advantages that 
entails. Greek Cypriots will be able to live without fear of Turkish 
soldiers manning a line through the middle of their divided capital, 
will see the island become a real east Mediterranean hub through 
full access to Turkey, the region’s biggest economy. According to 
a study by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the Cypriot 
economy will grow by an additional ten percentage points within 
seven years. Both Greece and Cyprus will gain a more pro-
European Turkey as a neighbour that will be inclined to settle 
conflicts over the Aegean and Mediterranean territorial waters. 
Turkey will win a more open negotiating road for EU membership, 
greater stature in Europe and official language status for Turkish 
in the EU. At the same time it will lose the financial burden of its 
Cyprus garrison and the subsidy consumed by the Turkish 
Cypriot administration.
 Since the EU and Turkey are currently paying the political 
cost of the Cypriots’ failure to compromise, EU leaders should 
engage more actively to prevent the Cyprus problem derailing 
Turkey’s accession process. This process is essential for Turkey’s 
transformation and is of vital importance to the EU and Cyprus as 
quarters of towns and isolated villages. After the colonels’ regime 
in Athens backed a Greek Cypriot coup in Cyprus in 1974 that 
aimed to unite the island with Greece, Turkey invoked its right to 
intervene as guarantor and staged a military invasion, eventually 
occupying the northern 37% of the island. 
 Impending membership of the EU in 2004 changed many 
Cypriot dynamics. Years of UN-mediated talks on a deal to 
reunify the island and remove Turkish troops had not progressed 
far due to continued old-style nationalist grandstanding on 
both sides. But at a referendum, the Turkish Cypriots, backed by 
Turkey, voted 65% in favour of the UN-brokered deal, known as 
the Annan Plan, whereas 76% of Greek Cypriots voted against 
it. Even though the EU had publicly and insistently backed the 
Annan Plan, it nevertheless allowed the Greek Cypriots to enter 
as the sole representatives of the island. One of the Republic of 
Cyprus’s first actions as a member was to force the EU to break 
its political promise to reward the Turkish Cypriots for their 
“yes” vote, blocking a Direct Trade Regulation that would have 
allowed Turkish Cypriots direct access to EU markets. Greek 
Cypriot embargoes on Turkish Cypriots were first criticized by UN 
Secretary General U Thant as a “veritable siege” in 1964, and in 
2004 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said “the Turkish Cypriot 
vote has undone any rationale for pressuring and isolating them”. 
In response to the perceived unfairness, Turkey then back-tracked 
on its obligation under the Additional Protocol to the 1963 EU-
Turkey Association Agreement to open its airports and sea ports to 
Greek Cypriot traffic. 
 The situation is not hopeless, however. The Greek Cypriot 
community registered a notable change of heart in presidential 
elections in February 2008. In the first round, two-thirds of the 
electorate voted for candidates who campaigned on compromise 
strategies for reunification. The ultimate winner, President 
Demetris Christofias, soon embarked on a promising new round 
of talks with his counterpart, Mehmet Ali Talat, who had led the 
Turkish Cypriots to vote “yes” to the Annan Plan. 
 These talks are registering significant progress, but risk 
succumbing to complacency and are running short of time. 
First and foremost, responsibility for reaching a settlement lies 
with Cypriots themselves. But they need the full support of 
EU governments and Turkish decision-makers in Ankara. EU 
leaders can achieve this through frequent visits to the Cypriot 
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well. Alongside their efforts to support a settlement on the island, 
the EU should search for ways and means that lead to the fulfilment 
of Turkey’s commitment to open its airports and sea ports to Greek 
Cypriot traffic, a development that would immediately release 
eight chapters to the Turkey-EU negotiating process and win time 
to reach a fuller Cyprus settlement. The EU could do this through 
reviving its 2004 promise to end Turkish Cypriot isolation through 
direct trade and try to overcome obstacles to direct international 
flights to the Turkish Cypriots’ own airport. The EU must assume 
its responsibility for the injustices and absurdities of the situation. 
The whole of Cyprus is theoretically now part of the European 
Union; on the other hand, the acquis communautaire of the Union 
is officially suspended in the north; at the same time, the European 
Court of Justice has ruled that Greek Cypriot court judgments 
about the north are enforceable throughout the Union. 
 A Cyprus settlement, and the need for all sides to 
avoid provocations and work for a solution, is now urgent. 
Grandstanding between gunboats and oil survey ships in the 
waters around Cyprus, Turkey and Greece in November 2008 
shows where deepening frustrations may lead: similar frictions 
between Turkey and EU-member Greece very nearly resulted in 
armed conflict in 1987 and 1996, crises which the EU was powerless 
to solve and which had to be settled by the United States. The 
Turkish Cypriots in April 2009 voted in a new, more nationalist 
government, signalling that without a settlement Mehmet Ali 
Talat may lose his seat in the April 2010 presidential elections to a 
candidate less committed to a solution. Non-solution and never-
ending negotiations in Cyprus will raise tensions on the island and 
will indefinitely block the EU-Turkey process. If old friends like 
Talat and Christofias fail to reach a federal settlement, it is hard to 
see how anyone either inside or outside Cyprus will ever mobilize 
behind a new effort. Yet managing the alternative, the partition 
of Cyprus, will be extremely divisive for the EU. European leaders 
have compelling interests to work with priority commitment for 
a negotiated Cyprus settlement in 2009, because the chance of a 
federal solution and demilitarization of the island will certainly 
not come again in this political generation.
The Kurdish question is a perennial problem in Turkey due to a 
mix of regional under-development, denial of cultural rights, 
human rights abuses by Turkish state security forces and 25 years 
of terrorist attacks by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The 
Kurds number about 12 million people or 15% of the inhabitants 
of Turkey. About half live in the Kurdish-majority areas of 
the southeast, the rest in western Turkey and metropolises 
like Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul. Most Kurds share the same 
Sunni Muslim religious tradition as the majority of Turks, with 
whom intermarriage is common, and there is a substantial 
overlap in history and customs. As among the Turks, some 10% 
of Kurds adhere to the Alevi faith. A sense of national identity is 
growing among Kurds but lacks political weight due to significant 
differences of region, dialect, tribal identity and attitudes toward 
the Turkish state. Some Kurds talk of autonomy and a few of 
independence for the Kurdish majority-areas of the southeast, 
but this would be both impractical and counter-productive for 
a variety of reasons. There would be explosive arguments 
about where the boundaries of this area might be, and autonomy 
could have negative consequences for the many Kurds living 
in western parts of the country.
 There is no easy answer as to who represents Turkey’s 
Kurdish citizens. Kurds in mainstream Turkish parties already 
make up about one sixth of parliament and the Cabinet. The 
Kurdish nationalist party, the Democratic Society Party (DTP), 
seems to command about half of the vote in Kurdish-majority 
areas. Its legitimacy in the eyes of many Turks is however 
compromised by the fact that its leaders voice sympathy for the 
PKK, officially labelled as a terrorist group by Turkey, the EU 
and many others. The DTP has been the subject of a court case 


















reopen some cases of Kurds who disappeared in those 
years. Restrictions on expressions of Kurdish culture were 
liberalized. A few private Kurdish language centres opened their 
doors, although most soon succumbed to bureaucratic harassment 
and a lack of local demand. In the mainly Kurdish southeast and 
elsewhere, Kurdish-language bumper stickers, music, publications, 
festive days, radio and television all became first legal, then 
tolerated and then broadly accepted. The government successfully 
began implementing a World Bank poverty relief program.
 These positive developments are not always noted or 
appreciated in Europe. Some EU states have been too lenient on 
the PKK, allowing their intelligence agencies to do deals with 
the organization’s operatives in return for information, letting 
identified PKK operatives escape justice after breaking EU states’ 
laws and withholding cooperation with Turkey on repatriation 
or proper trials in the relevant country. In the Independent 
Commission’s view they should do demonstrably more to prevent 
PKK fund-raising and organization in their countries, work to 
overcome the inter-EU mismatch in judicial systems in this context 
and not allow the PKK’s secrecy and skill at camouflaging its 
operations to defeat differing levels of political will in EU states.
 More generally, Turkey-EU convergence helps a fundamental 
European interest to encourage broader respect for human rights 
and cultural freedoms in Turkey, not just to create a more secure 
environment in the European neighbourhood but also to prevent 
the kind of blowback violence inside the EU among immigrant 
communities of Turks and Kurds seen in the 1990s. A more stable 
and prosperous Turkey integrated into EU mechanisms would 
also be a better partner in dealing with EU concerns about other 
offshoots of the Kurdish problem, drug trafficking and illegal 
immigration.
 Turkey has seen considerable progress in terms of economic 
development and political reforms that have relieved Turkish-
Kurdish tensions. However, given how much 
further Turkey has to move from the bitter 
legacies of the past, more has to be done 
in order to secure enduring social peace 
throughout Turkey. The opening of a Kurdish-language 24-
hour state television channel in January 2009 was a good step 
forward, showing once again what Turkey could have achieved 
more painlessly if such moves had been made decades ago. 
to close it down since 2007, charged with organizational links 
to the PKK and because some of its demands for autonomy 
are perceived as an attack on the constitutional unity of the 
country. Nevertheless, DTP is fully part of Turkey’s political 
culture. Many of its demands for more Kurdish rights and respect 
for the Kurdish identity are also privately made by leading Kurdish 
parliamentarians in AKP and other parties. The possible banning 
of DTP by the Constitutional Court is unlikely to contribute to the 
solution of the Kurdish problem.
 The PKK itself, and its jailed leader Öcalan do not constitute 
a legitimate political party, and they have committed too many 
terrorist acts to have a legalized future in Turkey. With about 
5,000 armed militants, perhaps half of them in Turkey and half 
in remote mountainous areas of northern Iraq, the PKK pursues 
an agenda of national liberation. But it uses terrorist and criminal 
methods, including extortion, drug-running, attacks on conscript-
manned outposts and bombings of civilians and European tourists 
inside Turkey.
 The ruling AKP has proved to be a party with strong 
support among both Turks and Kurds, winning half of the 
vote in the southeast, and has arguably done more to improve 
the situation of the Kurds than any previous government. It 
was helped by the capture of PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, a subsequent PKK 
cease-fire and the decision to commute the 
Kurdish militant’s death sentence for terrorist 
acts, another achievement of Turkey’s EU 
convergence. The brutal repression of all signs of Kurdishness 
of the 1980s faded, and mainstream Turkish commentators 
now openly criticize defunct official propaganda about Kurds 
being “mountain Turks”. Turkey started accepting international 
legal oversight and honouring rulings of the European Court of 
Human Rights. A third of the 350,000 Kurds officially counted as 
having been forced from their villages by the government during 
the 1990s clashes received some compensation and returned 
to their homes. A group of Kurdish nationalist politicians in 
jail since 1994 on charges of PKK links were released in 2004. 
Several members of the armed and security forces long mentioned 
in Turkish media as suspects in death-squad killings of Kurdish 
nationalists in the 1990s were jailed after 2008 in the Ergenekon 
conspiracy trial, and new evidence allowed prosecutors to 
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Twenty years ago, wariness or hostility defined Turkey’s relations 
with all of its many neighbours. Today, ties with only two of the 
eight states bordering Turkey remain problematic, Cyprus and 
Armenia, and Turkey has initiated promising processes to settle 
outstanding problems with both. Having been absent for many 
decades from the Balkans, Central Asia, Middle East and Africa, 
Turkish diplomacy is now active and appreciated on several fronts. 
 Turkey’s new neighbourhood policy made its first 
breakthrough in 1998. After Ankara persuaded Damascus to expel 
PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, the Kurdish militant was captured 
following an odyssey that included extended stays in Italy and 
the Embassy of Greece in Kenya. Greece changed policy after this 
exposure of its officials’ complicity, aided by an outpouring of 
mutual solidarity after twin earthquakes in Turkey and Greece 
in 1999. Just three years after the two sides had nearly gone to war 
over claims to a rocky islet in the Aegean Sea, Greek and Turkish 
foreign ministers led a process of Greece-Turkey normalization 
that cleared Turkey’s path to official EU candidacy status in 
December 1999 and later brought great economic benefits and 
lower defence spending to both sides.
 The turnaround in Turkey’s relationship with Syria was 
equally dramatic. Trade, flights and tourism between the two 
countries all rose rapidly, as did mutual visits between the 
leaderships. Whereas the regime in Damascus had previously 
opposed NATO-member Turkey’s few overtures to the Arab 
world, it now became its ally, helping Turkey become an observer 
at the Arab League, despite the fact that Turkey had cemented its 
long-standing ties with Israel with a military training agreement 
in 1996. In 2008, Turkey’s relationship with both Syria and Israel 
brought about several rounds of proximity talks between Syrian 
Such liberalization should be backed up with full legal and 
constitutional protections for the use of Kurdish languages, in 
broadcasting, public buildings, schools and political speeches. 
Kurdish place names should be unbanned and Kurdish institutes 
should be permitted in universities desiring to found them. 
Constitutional articles that appear to privilege one ethnicity over 
another should be rewritten to give all citizens of Turkey genuine 
equality. Continuing to deny Kurdish citizens in Turkey the full 
use of their language and identity is incompatible with Turkey’s 
EU membership. It also contravenes the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne 
that founded the Turkish republic, which unequivocally states in 
Article 39 that “no restrictions shall be imposed on the free use 
by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in 
commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind 
or at public meetings”. 
V   Turkey and its region
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contributing troops and commanders to the EU’s Balkan and 
NATO’s Afghan missions. Further afield, Turkey has also become 
an observer in the Gulf Cooperation Council and the African 
Union, and its candidate won the first democratic election to 
head the 57-nation Organization of the Islamic Conference. This 
productive activism was crowned with success when 151 states 
voted for Turkey to become a non-permanent member of the UN 
Security Council in 2009-10.
 Perhaps the most notable example of Turkey’s new and 
successful engagement with its region has been the development 
of a carefully balanced Iraq policy. As it repaired relations with the 
United States – damaged after the Turkish parliament declined to 
allow U.S. troops to invade through Turkish territory, a democratic 
reflex that any European state might have been proud of – one of its 
first contributions was to help reconcile Sunni Muslims to the new 
Iraqi order. It has also built up ties with factions in the Shia Muslim 
majority, giving them some alternative to their main relationship 
with Iran. From 2003 onwards, Turkey initiated meetings of 
Iraq’s neighbours, whose foreign ministers met a dozen times 
to reduce chances of a break-up of Iraq. Above all, it overcame 
old taboos and started working publicly with Iraq’s Kurdistan 
Regional Government. The policy has helped Iraq and reined in 
the PKK, whose chief bases are in northern Iraq. Turkish products 
and contractors, long dominant in the Iraqi Kurdish market, are 
increasingly prominent all over Iraq, and potential partners for 
European companies seeking business there. 
 Many Muslim leaders, intellectuals and opinion-makers 
perceive the EU’s treatment of Turkey as an indicator of European 
attitudes towards the Muslim world. The presence of more than 
200 Middle Eastern journalists to witness the decision to open 
accession negotiations with Turkey at the Brussels European 
Council of December 2004 well illustrates this resonance. But it 
would be wrong to see Turkey’s intensified relationship with its 
eastern neighbours as an “Islamic” foreign policy, even if President 
Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan have been more open towards 
the Middle East than earlier generations of Turkish policy-makers. 
Moreover, Turkish leaders’ interventions in Islamic meetings often 
highlight European concerns about reforms, women’s rights and 
the need to end the habit of blaming all the region’s ills on Israel. 
 The rebalancing of Turkey’s international profile is not just 
between east and west: It may be a NATO member, but Russia 
and Israeli diplomats in Istanbul, a contribution to the Arab-
Israeli peace process that goes beyond what is normally achieved 
by the EU. Furthermore, Turkey was able to back up Egyptian 
and French initiatives – at their requests – with its own talks with 
Hamas to help broker an end to the Gaza crisis in January 2009. 
Strong criticism of the Israeli assault on the Palestinian territory 
by Turkish leaders damaged Turkey’s image as a neutral broker in 
Israel, and worried Arab leaders that the Turks might be seeking a 
populist limelight, but at the same time it confirmed to regional 
populations that, among non-Arab actors, it was not just Iran that 
felt and articulated their concerns.
 Turkey has a level and frequency of access to the Iranian 
leadership that is greater than that of EU countries, and 
consistently supports the EU position on Iran’s nuclear 
programme and on halting any weaponisation. This is not the 
only dynamic by which a Europeanizing Turkey can influence 
Iran’s Islamic Republic. Iranians do not need visas to enter Turkey, 
and one million visit each year to sample Turkey’s free-wheeling 
beaches and hotels alongside two million Russians and four 
million Germans. There is nothing fundamentally un-European 
about the prospect of having the EU’s eastern edge in eastern 
Turkey, where the frontier of the Roman Empire lay, and neither is 
it destabilizing. The dividing line between Turkey and Iran is one 
of the oldest national borders in the world, having stayed the same 
since the time the two countries ended the last war between  
them in 1639.
 Newly confident and respected by its neighbours thanks 
to its accession negotiations with the EU, AKP has built up the 
Turkish regional policy it inherited as a major achievement of its 
government.  Supported by President Gül and Prime Minister 
Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s name in particular 
has been associated with a “zero-problem” policy of peace-
promotion in the region, and, through “maximum cooperation”, 
to reverse a tendency of previous Turkish external policy to focus 
on perceived foreign enemies or foreign scapegoats for domestic 
ills. Beyond its Syria-Israel mediation Turkey has made significant 
contributions to regional peace-making by fostering a trilateral 
process with Pakistan and Afghanistan, by helping solve the 2008 
Lebanon presidential election crisis, by initiating a Caucasus 
Stability and Cooperation Platform as a framework for all sides 
to communicate after Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and by 
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democracy, national pride and Muslim traditions. The example of 
its transformation has acted to project the soft power of core EU 
values eastward. Turkey has thus helped push problems further 
away from the borders of the European Union, demonstrating 
that an EU-member Turkey with borders on Syria, Iran and Iraq is 
not a liability but makes a good partner to help manage and assist 
European interests in the Middle East and elsewhere. In Central 
Asian states, for instance, most of whose populations speak Turkic 
languages, Turkish businessmen are often the single biggest 
group, the most experienced contractors and the 
companies that are able to perform most quickly 
and effectively. An EU-empowered Turkey could 
add Europe as a player to a region currently 
dominated by Russia, China and the United States. 
 There is no other country whose leaders can and do travel so 
often between capitals as varied as Moscow and Damascus, Tehran 
and Jerusalem, and be received with respect and be able to advocate 
important policy goals so widely. Turkey cannot solve any crisis or 
problem for the EU single-handedly, but without Turkey, the EU’s 
task in the region becomes a harder uphill struggle.
is now its biggest single trading partner and energy supplier, 
and Turkey has avoided being caught in any tensions between 
Russia and the West. European policy-makers have been slow 
to appreciate the extent to which Turkey and especially Istanbul 
have become an all-round regional hub since the end of the Cold 
War, which had cut off NATO-member Turkey from much of its 
natural commercial hinterland in the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus 
and Middle East. European visa policies mean even European 
companies find it useful to base regional operations in Istanbul, 
and many contracts signed by multinationals in Russia or Central 
Asia would not be won or completed without the diligent support 
of Turkish sub-contractors. 
 Turkey’s geography already makes it important for European 
energy security, with major energy transport routes criss-crossing 
the country. These include tankers passing through the Turkish 
Straits, oil pipelines to the Mediterranean from 
Iraq and Azerbaijan and natural gas pipelines 
from Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. Natural 
gas already transits westward to Greece and 
an onward connection to Italy is planned. 
There were those who dismissed each of these pipelines as pipe 
dreams at the beginning, but the network has steadily grown. 
Implementation of the theoretically promising Nabucco natural 
gas pipeline project from Turkey to the EU has been delayed by a 
lack of politically easy gas supplies and excess transit and profit 
demands by Turkey. The planned pipeline also suffers from a lack 
of European sense of purpose, even though Nabucco offers the real 
chance of new non-Russian gas supplies from the Caspian basin, 
Iraq and Iran, if Tehran’s relationship with Washington improves. 
The signing of the key inter-governmental agreement in July is 
an important step forward. In view of Turkey’s role as a possible 
energy hub, it is ironic that Cyprus is forcing the EU to block the 
opening of the Energy chapter in the accession negotiations. While 
Turkey and the EU will both clearly remain dependent on Russia’s 
huge oil and gas reserves, Ankara could be a key EU energy partner 
if European leaders were more ready to commit funding to such 
projects and consistency to the Turkey relationship. Russia has 
been the only winner from dissent on this matter so far.
 Turkey contributes to crisis-solving; is building up its role 
as a world crossroads for energy transport; and inspires regional 
imitators of its relatively successful mix of market economy, 
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The relationship between Turkey and Armenia is burdened by 
a number of inter-connected problems. Turks and Armenians 
have disagreed about how to describe the Ottoman-era massacres 
committed against Armenians in the First World War. On top 
of this, Turkey, which has a close partnership with Azerbaijan 
based on linguistic ties and now major oil and gas pipelines, has 
long linked any improvement in its relationship with Armenia to 
a negotiated settlement of the Armenians’ 1992-1994 conquest of 
Azerbaijan’s Armenian-majority enclave of Nagorno Karabakh. 
These disputes meant that Turkey and Armenia failed to open 
diplomatic relations after the break-up of the Soviet Union. 
Turkey also closed the Armenia border in 1993 to put pressure on 
Armenian forces to withdraw from the 13.5% of Azerbaijan they 
currently occupy.
 The young Turkish Republic, feeling threatened from all sides 
in its fight for national survival, never faced up to the atrocities 
committed during the dying days of the Ottoman 
Empire. It was also alarmed by territorial claims 
and demands for reparations by Armenians, and 
resented that Turkish casualties and war-time 
conditions in eastern Anatolia as the Ottomans 
fought invaders on three fronts were not taken into 
account. To question the official line became a criminal offence 
and the issue a taboo.
 Armenia, meanwhile, requested that the events be recognized 
as “genocide” by Turkey. The large Armenian diasporas in Europe 
and America have been radical in pursuing this demand. Diaspora 
terrorists killed 30 members of the Turkish diplomatic service 
and their families between 1973 and 1984. On the political front, 
diaspora lobbyists, with the moral support of Armenia, have won 
genocide recognition resolutions from more than 20 parliaments, 
including several in Europe.
 In the past decade there has been remarkable change in 
Turkey on the Armenian issue, in parallel with a new national 
self-confidence generated by the virtuous circle of EU outreach 
to Turkey and EU-backed domestic reforms. The trend was 
led by academics, the Turkish community first exposed to the 
full range of international scholarship about the Armenian 
question. Novelists began to explore a sense of loss and guilt 
about the once vital Armenian pillar of Ottoman society. Broader 
sources of information became available to the general public 
too, through travel, translations of books and the internet. In 
2005, Turkey’s leaders called for the matter to be turned over to 
a Turkish-Armenian joint commission of historians, a proposal 
regrettably not accepted by Armenia. Turkish official statements 
and schoolbooks began avoiding the use of the old term “so-called 
genocide” in favour of more neutral terminology like “the events of 
1915”. In 2008, reflecting a growing sense that it was time to come 
to terms, 200 intellectuals, later joined by 30,000 other Turkish 
citizens, signed an online petition apologizing in their personal 
capacity for the “great catastrophe” that befell the Armenians  
in 1915.
 There was also movement on bilateral relations between 
the two countries. Air links have remained open for much of the 
period despite the closure of the border. Each month Turkish 
businessmen truck some ten million dollars worth of exports 
to Armenia through Georgia and Iran. Tens of thousands of 
Armenians have been informally allowed to stay 
in Turkey to work. Over the last years, secret talks 
progressed between Turkish and Armenian officials. 
After the election of Armenian President Serzh 
Sarkisian in February 2008, a new page was turned. 
Turkish President Gül accepted an invitation to 
attend a Turkey-Armenia football match in Yerevan 
in September 2008. This encounter was followed up by intense 
but discreet diplomatic contacts including on the level of Foreign 
Ministers. In April 2009, the two sides announced agreement on 
a “comprehensive framework” for normalization. Without being 
publicly spelled out, it was widely known to foresee the establishing 
of diplomatic relations, the re-opening of the border and the 
setting up of a bilateral commission including a sub-commission 
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the European Parliament, which has in the past shown sensitivity 
about the Armenian issue. 
 The Independent Commission is convinced that a 
normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia remains 
within reach and that it would symbolize much of the regional 
good that Turkey’s policy of neutrality in the neighbourhood has 
been trying to achieve, setting an example of statesmanship that 
can help to calm the volatile situation in the south Caucasus. 
to deal with the events of 1915. Regrettably, Turkey appeared to 
step back from the deal a few weeks later, publicly linking any 
Turkish movement to the Nagorno Karabakh situation once again.
 There is a complex triangle that connects the three main 
issues in play: the events of 1915, Turkey-Armenia normalization 
and the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Progress on any of these 
matters would have a positive impact on the others. Not allowing 
progress on any of them, on the other hand, would just prolong 
past stalemates. It is a fact, for instance, that keeping the Turkey-
Armenia border closed for 16 years has not helped Azerbaijan win 
back any territory occupied by Armenia. An Armenia made to 
feel more secure by a normalized relationship with Turkey, on the 
contrary, could start the ball rolling for progress in settling this 
conflict, which has defied international mediation for almost  
two decades.
 Turkey-Armenia normalization will make the process of 
reconciliation with the past easier and vice-versa. Coming to terms 
with its history, however, is a task to be carried out by Turkish 
society itself. Historians from both sides can prepare the ground, 
preferably working together and with third parties so that their 
research can be fully credible to the other side. Legislation by 
foreign parliaments, on the other hand, has been and remains 
counter-productive to this process, provoking nationalistic 
reactions and holding up change. Furthermore, genocide 
resolutions stand little chance of persuading Turkey, since these 
usually seem to be products of domestic political pressures rather 
than high moral concerns, and ignore the way most legislatures 
tend to be silent on their own past national short-comings.
 With considerable political courage, Turkey’s President Gül 
and Armenia’s President Sarkisian have broken the taboos that 
ruled out progress for too long. Both sides should make best use 
of the dynamics thus created and return as quickly as possible 
to the road-map that treats Turkey-Armenia normalization 
separately from other issues in the Caucasus. For Armenia this will 
end its blockaded isolation, its near-total dependence on Russia 
and open a western gateway to Europe. In Turkey’s case, while 
not a formal criteria for eventual EU accession, honest work to 
settle the controversy will send a powerful message to Europeans 
about Turkey’s readiness to reconcile itself with its past. Good 
relations with all neighbours are expected from an EU candidate 


























From its foundation in 1923, the Republic of Turkey has modelled 
itself on the French ideal of a secular state and aimed to remove 
religion from any role in government and politics. Individual 
freedom of religion is protected, while legal sanctions block any 
advocacy of a return to Shariah Islamic law. The state meanwhile 
keeps control of an established Sunni Muslim hierarchy, paying the 
country’s prayer leaders as civil servants, owning most mosques 
and centrally directing the content of sermons. This system is a 
main foundation of the modern Turkish state.
 Secular Turks and some Europeans are concerned with what 
they perceive as a progressive “Islamisation” of Turkish society 
in recent years. More women appear to wear headscarves in city 
centres, and in conservative neighbourhoods it now seems more 
common to see women wearing black çarşaf 
cloaks covering their heads and bodies. They 
relate this to the AKP government and its alleged 
“hidden agenda” to turn Turkey into a state 
based on Islamist principles. Opponents of the 
ruling party point to the way the government 
has recruited civil servants with a more observant religious 
culture. They also complain that AKP-run municipalities cultivate 
a “neighbourhood pressure” that intimidates women against 
wearing what they want in religious neighbourhoods, deters people 
from eating or drinking in public during the Ramadan month 
of Muslim fasting and has effectively driven the sale of alcohol 
out of the centres of provincial towns. One consequence of this 
perception was that ten of the eleven judges of the Constitutional 
Court, a bastion of Turkish secularism, found the AKP guilty in 
2008 of being “a focal point of anti-secular activities”. The court 
did not, however, find enough evidence to close the party down.
 The AKP, for its part, sees itself as the Muslim equivalent of 
a Christian Democrat party in Europe. AKP says its secularist 
opponents use charges of Islamism as a pretext to keep hold of the 
levers of bureaucratic power, using methods from the Republic’s 
authoritarian past. If the party had an Islamist agenda, its leaders 
add, they would be advocating the imposition of Islamic law, which 
they do not. Indeed, AKP’s concern is clearly to win elections and 
to stay in office, and leaning towards Islamism would alienate 
more votes than it attracts in Turkey. The country does have an 
even more explicitly religious and conservative party, from which 
AKP’s more centrist leaders split off in 2001, but it won only 5.2% 
of the vote in March 2009. Furthermore, Turkish society now has 
a secular bedrock. This was demonstrated again when the people 
of western Turkish cities, who have historically determined the 
country’s direction, staged peaceful mass demonstrations in 
support of secular principles in 2007 and gave strong support for 
secularist parties in the 2009 municipal elections.
 Clearly, there is an increase in the importance of religion in 
Turkish society, a phenomenon that can be seen in other countries 
and other faiths. This is partly a consequence of the more open 
atmosphere as Turkey evolves; partly due to the migration of 
people from traditionally more religious rural areas to the western 
cities; and partly because of a struggle for power between the 
newly urbanized, upwardly mobile, observant conservatives of 
AKP and the old guard secularists in the establishment, military 
and judiciary. A typical example of this polarization is the 
question over whether Turkey should lift a ban on women wearing 
headscarves in universities. Outsiders too have taken both sides 
in this debate. Human Rights Watch, for instance, supports the 
right of adult women to wear what they want, while the European 
Court of Human Rights has backed the Turkish Constitutional 
Court’s ban. At the same time, 70% of Turks support women 
college students’ right to use headscarves. Turkish women face 
much worse difficulties of concern – including honour killings, 
family obstacles to girls’ education, arranged marriages and low 
representation in the upper reaches of the work force – but these are 
problems of poverty, tradition and education, not AKP or Islam.
 It is difficult to arrive at a firm conclusion on these sensitive 
issues, which are of importance for many Europeans. For instance, 
while many people have the impression that more Turkish women 
are wearing headscarves on city centre streets, a study by Turkey’s 
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government should address their concerns with greater  
urgency too.
 Turkey is already today the most democratic, secular state in 
the Muslim world. The Independent Commission is convinced 
that to anchor Turkey firmly in the EU would provide additional 
protection to the secular principles of the Republic.
Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) showed that in 
fact the wearing of headscarves has decreased in absolute terms. 
What can be said is that the secular system is not in doubt. Polls 
show that less than 10% of Turks support Shariah law as an ideal, 
and, when the more outdated injunctions such as polygamy and 
corporal punishment are spelled out, the support level drops to a 
fraction of that. There is no question that after 
80 years, secularism is a well-founded pillar of 
the Republic of Turkey, even if making the state 
equidistant from the religions of all Turkish 
citizens is still a work in progress. Nevertheless, media speculation, 
court cases and political rhetoric about the orientation and 
intentions of the AKP, while part of a political power struggle, also 
reflect the real concerns of liberal civil society, and require careful 
observation. It is regrettable that AKP leaders have not done more 
to soothe the legitimate anxieties of secularists in Turkey.
 Of particular interest to European opinion, too, is the status 
of non-Muslims in Turkey. Armenian, Jewish, Greek Orthodox 
and other Christian communities amount to about 0.2% of the 
Turkish population, or 150,000 people, and have suffered periods 
of discrimination and harassment during the country’s history. 
The tragic murders of a Roman Catholic priest, an Armenian 
Turkish newspaper editor and three members of a provincial 
evangelist congregation in the past three years appear to be 
isolated incidents that have as much to do with xenophobic gangs 
as religious discrimination. Individual freedom of worship has 
long been guaranteed in theory and practice in Turkey, but the 
main problem is of a different nature. Turkey must modernize its 
approach to the legal personality of and ownership of property by 
religious communities; give freedom to the training of priests of 
all legal denominations; liberalize the granting of work permits for 
foreign clergymen; and end indirect local bureaucratic difficulties 
in the maintenance and improvement of churches and prayer halls 
for non-mainstream faiths. In order to mitigate some of these 
problems, the government in 2008 enacted a Law on Foundations 
that aims to restore non-Muslim property rights and allow 
religious communities to own properties. This law, however, can 
only be seen as a first step in the right direction. 
 The 4.5 million Turks living in Europe enjoy wide freedoms 
to exercise their religion, including the building of thousands 
of mosques. As more and more EU citizens live in Turkey, the 
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Turkey has a functioning market economy, and its resilience to 
the global financial crisis demonstrates the considerable progress 
made during the past decade of convergence with Europe. 
High economic growth in 2002-2007 was achieved alongside 
successful disinflation. Debt levels in the national accounts fell, 
thanks to primary budget surpluses, International Monetary 
Fund-backed fiscal discipline and buoyant conditions in pre-
crisis international markets. Historically large amounts of direct 
investment continue to flow into the country, further supporting 
stability and development in the economy. A key anchor of this 
rising prosperity has been the increasing security of investment 
and policy predictability provided by the transformation aimed at 
EU membership. Turkey remains an economy with great potential 
for European business, with its young and fast-growing market, 
its proven base for high-quality manufacturing and its companies 
familiar with a wide and developing region of which Turkey is a 
principal commercial hub.
Real GPD growth (2002 – 2007 average)
 
Overall, Turkey kept up an average 7% GDP growth between 2002-
2007, although the rate slowed down to 1.1% in 2008 amidst the 
global downturn. The IMF has warned Turkey to brace itself for a 
5% contraction in 2009, due to a fall in exports, consumption and 
investment, but the IMF expects a return to 1.5% 
growth in 2010. Both the budget deficit and debt 
stock – 2.2% and 39.5% of GDP based on EU 
definitions in 2008 – now meet the Maastricht 
criteria. The crisis has also taken pressure off 
Turkey’s current account deficit, running at 5.7% of GDP in 2008 
and predicted by the IMF to fall to 1.2% in 2009. Turkey’s relatively 
high inflation of 10.4% in 2008 – down from 45% in 2003 and 
84% in 1998 – was still lower than several EU members including 
Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Estonia. The IMF and Turkish 
Central Bank expect inflation to drop to around 7% in 2009. 
Exports rose 23% to reach $132 billion and imports 19% to $202 
billion in 2008. In 2009, however, the government expects a 7% 
drop in exports and 10.4% fall in imports.
Exports and Imports
 The banking sector has proven particularly strong, thanks 
to a shake-out during a domestic Turkish financial crisis in 2000-
2001 and the new Banking Act of 2005. Bank capital adequacy 
ratios were higher than Poland or Hungary in 2008 and total 
capital actually rose 9% in September 2008-March 2009, the worst 
months of the global financial crisis, to which no Turkish bank 
has yet succumbed. The quality of loans to Turkish corporate 
borrowers may have deteriorated, but profits rose 23% in Turkish 
lira terms in the first quarter of 2009 compared to a year earlier. 
Both the budget  
deficit and debt stock  
of Turkey now meet  
the Maastricht criteria.













































































































In a typical example of the country’s growth potential, Turkish 
households borrow only one seventh as much as in the EU. At 
the same time, Turkey is a young country, with 61% of Turks 
under 35 years old. Since 2002, the financial sector has attracted 
considerable foreign investment, with Italian, British, French, 
Belgian, Dutch and Greek banks taking major stakes in Turkish 
banks, putting European banking brand-names and interests on 
the high street of every town in Turkey.
 Such purchases were part of a first major inflow of foreign 
direct investment that began pouring in when accession talks 
opened in 2005. After decades in which investment lingered at 
an annual level of $1-2 billion per year, it reached a peak of $22 
billion in 2007. EU-based entities accounted for two thirds of this 
investment during the decade, led by Greece, Austria, Germany, 
France and the UK. At the same time, the number of German 
companies operating in Turkey more than doubled to 3,000 in 
the three years after 2005, as Turkish German businesspeople 
moved quickly to take advantage of Turkey’s new potential. 
Despite roughly halving after the onset of the global crisis in 
mid-2008, investment into Turkey continued at a steady pace in 
the last quarter of 2008 ($3.8 billion). Further privatizations of 
state enterprises and a large state bank will likely attract still more 
European funds in the near future.
  Such privatizations netted about $50 billion for the Turkish 
state this decade and helped transform and internationalize the 
Turkish economy. Additionally, EU-based companies like France’s 
Carrefour, Austria’s OMV, Germany’s Bosch and Siemens and the 
UK’s Vodafone all made major investments in manufacturing, 
retailing, energy and telecommunications. The investment goes 
both ways, with Turkish firms raising their commitment to 
Europe. Major European household brand-names like Godiva 
chocolates, Grundig televisions, Blomberg household appliances 
and Villeroy and Boch tiles are now Turkish-owned product lines 
whose parent companies increasingly do the relevant design, 
engineering and manufacturing. Furthermore, the reality of Turks 
in Europe is now much removed from their 1960s-1980s images 
as guest workers. In 2008, over 130,000 Turks in Europe were 
entrepreneurs, with total investments worth approximately €14.4 
billion in businesses that employed around 600,000 people.
FDI in Turkey 2000 – 2008
(in US$ Billion)
 The 1996 Customs Union agreement with Turkey represents  
the deepest economic and trade relationship that the EU has  
with a non-member. There are shortcomings in this partnership, 
however. Turkey has particular grievances about the Free Trade 
Agreements that the EU negotiates with third countries, which, 
under customs union rules, gives them tariff-free access to the 
Turkish market without forcing them, at the same time, to open  
their markets to Turkey.
 The Turkish economy is not without its own problems. 
Unemployment in 2008 was officially 10.6%, and in reality it is 
probably even further above the EU average of 7.6%. In 2005, Turkey 
had the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
largest inter-regional differences in productivity levels and female 
participation in the economy, disparities that have 
caused disruptive, large-scale flows of migrants 
to more prosperous cities in the past. Agriculture 
provides 8.7% of GDP, compared to an average 
1.6% in the EU, and some 26% of Turks still 
work on farms, compared to 5.4% in the EU. However, the number 
of farmers has decreased from 33% in 2002. Turkey has begun 
reforming its large, fragmented and inefficient agricultural sector, 
and has started work to register farmers, reduce direct subsidies, 
remove artificial incentives and tackle problems of low productivity. 
 Aside from the EU candidacy, the other great anchor that 
secured Turkish policy and investor confidence in Turkey from 1999 
onwards was an IMF program that reached a successful conclusion 
in May 2008. Although Turkey has so far managed to cope with the 
global financial crisis due to the sudden drop in its current account 
deficit, structural problems remain. Rating agencies and Turkey’s 
Turkey has large  
inter-regional differences  
in productivity levels  
and female participation.
















own business community advocate the conclusion of a long-
discussed, two-year, $20 billion new IMF program deal before Fall 
2009. Failure to do so could well trigger a new vicious circle in which 
weaker market confidence results in increased outflows of foreign 
capital and downward pressures on the currency, leading to higher 
interest rates.
 Nevertheless the resilience of the Turkish economy has given 
it options that it never had before, underlining the inherent and 
growing strength of Turkey. It is, however, a regional power that 
must give priority to its relationship with Europe. Taken as a bloc, 
the EU is by far its most important trade partner. Trade with EU-27 
in 2008 made up 48 per cent of Turkey’s total exports and 37 per 
cent of imports (down from 56 per cent and 40 per cent in 2007 
respectively). For the EU, Turkey is the fifth biggest export market, 
ahead of Japan, and demand from the Turkish market can be very 
lucrative for European companies, as demonstrated by Turkish 
Airlines’ tender in January 2009 for 105 new airplanes. 
 The Independent Commission is convinced that the mutual 
economic benefits of Turkey-EU convergence, the volume of 
trade, the multiplicity of EU-Turkey business relationships and the 
potential for growth make a compelling case for further integration. 
Half-measures and talk of alternative arrangements to membership 
cannot persuade Turkey that it is a full player on the EU team 
and will harm EU companies in their attempts to win the future 
contracts they need. On the Turkish side, half-heartedness will hold 
up the regulatory changes it has to make in order to stay competitive 
and delay the transformation Turkey must undergo to deliver 
economic growth to its young and expanding workforce. In short, 
the goal of membership, sincerely embraced, is a major driving force 
that can deliver prosperity in both the EU and Turkey.
A comparison of economic indicators (2008)
 Units Turkey Croatia Bulgaria Romania Euro Area EU-27
GPD Billion Euro 498.4 47.4 34.1 137.0 9.209 12.507
GPD per cap at PPS* (forecast) EU-27=100 44.3 63.0 39.2 44.9 111.2 100.0
Inflation (consumer prices, year-end) % (change) 10.4 5.8 7.2 6.3 1.6 3.7
Gross government debt % (of GPD) 38.8** 37.7** 14.1 13.6 69.1 61.5
Budget surplus % (of GPD) -1.8 -1.6** 1.5 -5.4 -1.9 -2.3
Purchasing Power Standards, **2007 data
Sources: Eurostat, AMECO, IMF, Republic of Turkey Investment Support and Promotion Agency.
1 The European Council’s decision to begin accession 
negotiations with Turkey in 2005 opened the way for the country’s 
full integration into European structures, an ambition pursued by 
the Republic of Turkey since its foundation and which accelerated 
after World War II with Turkey’s membership of the Council of 
Europe and many other European organizations. Unfortunately, 
negative statements by some European leaders soon after the 
EU’s Heads of State or Government had taken their unanimous 
decision, efforts to substitute alternative arrangements to 
accession as the agreed objective and obstacles put in the way of 
the negotiations have all but derailed the process. In Turkey, this 
led to a dramatic drop in support for EU convergence from the 
Turkish public and reinforced the government’s 
lack of resolve in proceeding with Turkey’s 
transformation. This, in turn, fed arguments to 
the sceptics in European countries for whom the 
lack of reforms presented the proof that Turkey 
was unworthy of EU membership. The Independent Commission 
is of the view that the vicious circle thus created must be broken 
urgently, in the interest of both Turkey and the European Union. 
This will require a change of attitude of both European and 
Turkish leaderships. European governments must honour their 
commitments and treat Turkey with fairness and the respect it 
deserves. Turkey, including both its government and opposition, 
has to encourage its many supporters in Europe through a 
dynamic, broad-based reform process, thus confirming that it is 
willing and serious in its ambition to join the EU.
2 The decision by the European Council was very clear: the 
shared objective of negotiations with Turkey is accession, not any 
Conclusions
European governments 
must honour their 












alternative such as “privileged partnership” or an unspecified 
“special relationship”. Such concepts would exclude Turkey from 
participating in the EU’s political decision-making but offer 
little added value to its present status as an associate member and 
partner in a customs union. Moreover, these negotiations, by their 
nature, have to be geared towards membership. No country would 
take upon itself the large number of difficult reforms needed to 
adopt the acquis communautaire if full integration was not the 
objective. As in other negotiations, however, there is no guarantee 
that the agreed goal can be reached. In that sense Turkey’s 
accession negotiations are certainly an open-ended process.  
 
3 After the golden era of Turkish transformation in 2000-2005, 
Turkey failed to sustain the reform momentum. The slow-down 
was partly a reaction to negative attitudes towards Turkey and a 
general loss of direction in the EU, but was also due to AKP’s lack of 
resolve and domestic disruptions. A plot to topple the government, 
a Constitutional Court case to close AKP down and a public threat 
of intervention by the military were all linked to secularist factions 
in the army, judiciary and political parties. Such problems have 
now abated, and the ruling party has been strongly endorsed by the 
electorate in 2007 and 2009. The government has drawn up a new 
National Programme of EU reforms. It should now make good on 
its promises to both the EU and its own people to renew the reform 
process, in particular enacting a new constitution, a functioning 
ombudsman, full freedoms for religious organizations, respect for 
cultural liberties and wider freedom of expression. 
4 The ongoing talks between the leaders of the two communities 
in Cyprus present the best and probably last chance to end the 
division of the island and come to a mutually acceptable federal 
solution of this long-lasting dispute. A positive outcome would 
not only bring major benefits to both sides, it would also remove a 
pernicious obstacle to Turkey’s EU accession process and enhance 
the stability of this part of the Mediterranean region. Failure 
would likely lead to a long-drawn out partition of the island that 
would prove highly divisive for the EU. EU negotiations with 
Turkey would come to a halt. While the prime responsibility 
for an agreed settlement rests with the two communities and its 
leaders, European governments, in particular those of Greece and 
Turkey, should use all their influence to bring the negotiations 
to a successful conclusion. Moreover, Turkey must implement 
its obligations under the Additional Protocol and open its ports 
to Greek Cypriot traffic. At the same time the EU has to fulfil 
promises made in 2004 to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot 
community and allow it direct trade with the EU.
5 Helped by a new openness and greater tolerance in the wake 
of the 2000-2005 era of EU reforms, the ruling AKP has presided 
over more progress on Turkey’s long-running Kurdish problem 
than any previous government. Kurdish culture is now more 
broadly tolerated, a Kurdish-language 24-hour state television 
station was opened earlier this year and the government began 
implementing a poverty relief programme sponsored by the World 
Bank. Old taboos about dealing with the Kurdistan Regional 
Government in Iraq have been put aside, bringing Turkey more 
genuine cooperation in combating the PKK. These are certainly 
positive developments. However, in the interest of Turkey’s 
stability, more has to be done and with greater urgency. To grant 
Kurds the full use of their language and respect for their identity, 
securing genuine equality for all citizens of Turkey, combined with 
continued efforts to overcome social and economic deficiencies 
in the South-East, is the only way to eliminate dangerous tensions 
and to uproot this problem once and for all. 
6 The importance of Turkey’s geo-strategic position for Europe 
is highlighted by its role as hub for vital energy supplies from 
the Caspian Sea, Central Asia and the Middle East. In addition, 
Turkey has the potential of offering European economies easy 
access to markets in Central Asian states, where it retains a strong 
presence based on geography, language and ethnic ties. In recent 
years, Turkey’s new regional policy allowed it to settle outstanding 
disputes with most of its neighbours and to actively engage in crisis 
solving efforts in the wider region. The Independent Commission 
believes that Turkey’s full integration into Europe would not lead 
to further entanglement of the EU in dangerous situations in the 
Middle East and South Caucasus, but on the contrary enable it to 
better help solve these problems and to project stability into its 
volatile neighbourhood.
7 Turkish-Armenian relations have long been burdened 











Armenians, the lack of diplomatic relations, the closure of the 
border and – indirectly – the Nagorno Karabakh conflict between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. As a consequence of dynamics triggered 
by Turkey’s EU candidate status and the opening of accession 
negotiations, progress was achieved on most of these issues. In 
Turkey, the process of coming to terms with the past has begun 
in earnest and the events of 1915 are now being openly discussed. 
This is a task, however, which has to be carried out by Turkish 
society itself. Outside pressure, in particular resolutions by foreign 
parliaments labelling the events of 1915 as genocide, is counter-
productive and should be avoided. On bilateral relations, last 
year’s visit of President Gül to Yerevan has opened the way for full 
normalisation. The Independent Commission is of the view that 
this path should be continued by both parties without further 
delay and without linking it to the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Ending Armenia’s isolation and establishing friendly relations 
between Turkey and Armenia would surely have a positive impact 
on that conflict which has defied international mediation for 
almost two decades. 
8 During past years the importance of religion in Turkish 
society has been on the increase and the observance of religious 
practices and traditions by the faithful has become more visible. 
The secular establishment perceives this development as “creeping 
Islamisation” instigated by the ruling AKP and as a threat to 
Turkish secularism. For others it is the consequence of a more open 
atmosphere as Turkey evolves and of massive migration of people 
from traditionally more religious rural areas to western cities. For 
the overwhelming majority of Turks the secular system which 
constitutes one of the main pillars of the Republic of Turkey is not 
in doubt and no relevant political factor in Turkey advocates a state 
based on Islamic principles. In addition, as Turkish supporters of 
accession to the EU have pointed out, firmly anchoring the country 
in Europe would be the best protection for secularism in Turkey, 
and highlight Turkey’s positive experience of the modernization of 
Islam for Muslims in Europe and in the broader Muslim world.
9 Individual freedom of worship has long been guaranteed in 
theory and practice in Turkey. However, non-mainstream Muslim 
communities as well as the much smaller Christian churches 
are faced with a number of difficulties, some of them of a legal 
character. The government has taken certain measures recently 
to improve the situation. Nevertheless, more determined action is 
required to address these problems in a fully satisfactory manner.
10 Turkey’s economy demonstrated considerable resilience 
during the recent global financial crisis. No Turkish bank failed, 
partly due to a shake-out during a domestic 2000-2001 financial 
crisis, and partly due to structural transformations anchored 
by the accession process and a strict IMF programme. Until 
2008, Turkey’s economy grew by an average of 7%, and attracted 
unprecedented foreign investments, much of it from European 
banks and businesses. On the other hand, regional imbalances, a 
large agricultural sector and a high rate of unemployment continue 
to be of serious concern.
11 The Independent Commission remains convinced of the 
huge benefits of Turkish convergence with Europe and an eventual 
EU membership of a transformed Turkey, both for the country 
itself and the European Union. The impressive progress Turkey 
has made in all fields over the last ten years was 
clearly linked to the country’s EU candidate 
status and the accession process. To ensure 
a continuation of Turkey’s transformation 
its European perspective must be preserved. 
Nobody can predict the outcome of the accession process and 
whether the stated goal can be reached. To give it a fair chance, 
however, is a matter of the EU’s credibility, of self interest and of 
fairness due to all candidate countries.
To ensure a continuation  
of Turkey’s transformation 







Conclusions of the Independent Commission on Turkey’s 2004 Report
1 The Independent Commission on Turkey is of the view 
that accession negotiations should be opened as soon as Turkey 
fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria. Further delay would 
damage the European Union’s credibility and be seen as a breach 
of the generally recognised principle that “pacta sunt servanda” 
(agreements are to be honoured). Turkey, on the other hand, 
must accept that fulfilment of the political criteria includes the 
implementation of all legislation passed by parliament. Accession 
criteria apply to all candidate countries alike and there can be no 
shortcuts in individual cases. Equally, fairness demands that no 
candidate state should be submitted to more rigorous conditions 
than others. It is incumbent on the European Commission to 
assess whether Turkey’s compliance with the Copenhagen criteria 
has reached the critical mass necessary to recommend opening 
accession negotiations. 
2 As far as Turkey’s European credentials are concerned, Turkey 
is a Euro-Asian country, its culture and history closely entwined 
with Europe, with a strong European orientation and a European 
vocation which has been accepted for decades by European 
governments. In this, Turkey is fundamentally different from 
countries of Europe’s neighbourhood in both North Africa and the 
Middle East. Its accession to the European Union would therefore 
not necessarily serve as a model for the Union’s relations with 
these states. Any objections in principle against Turkey joining the 
European integration process should have been raised in 1959 at 
the time of Turkey’s first application, in 1987 when Turkey applied 
for the second time, or in 1999 before Turkey was given candidate 
Annex status. No government can claim that these decisions, including the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council of 2002 
on accession negotiations, were not taken in full knowledge of all 
circumstances.
3 The decision the European Council is taking in December will 
not be on Turkey’s membership to the EU, but on the opening of 
accession negotiations. Their duration and outcome will depend 
on progress made, in particular with regard to economic criteria 
and the acquis communautaire. It is expected that this process will 
take a long time, reflecting the scale of difficulties faced by such a 
large and complex country and the need for consolidation of the 
Union following the accession of ten new member states. This 
interval will present an opportunity for both sides to address the 
most urgent problems and to mitigate any negative effects Turkey’s 
accession could have. In other words, by the time a final decision is 
taken both Turkey and the European Union will have profoundly 
changed.
4 Turkey’s accession would offer considerable benefits both to 
the European Union and to Turkey. For the Union, the unique 
geopolitical position of Turkey at the crossroads of the Balkans, 
the wider Middle East, South Caucasus, Central Asia and beyond, 
its importance for the security of Europe’s energy supplies and 
its political, economic and military weight would be great assets. 
Moreover, as a large Muslim country firmly embedded in the 
European Union, Turkey could play a significant role in Europe’s 
relations with the Islamic world. 
For Turkey, EU accession would be the ultimate confirmation 
that its century-old orientation towards the West was the right 
choice, and that it is finally accepted by Europe. EU membership 
would also ensure that the country’s transformation into a modern 
democratic society has become irreversible, enabling Turkey to 
fully exploit its rich human and economic resources. 
A failure of the Turkish accession process would not only mean the 
loss of important opportunities for both sides. It could result in 
a serious crisis of identity in Turkey, leading to political upheaval 
and instability at the Union’s doorstep.
50 51
5 In spite of its size and special characteristics, and although 
it would unquestionably increase the Union’s heterogeneity as a 
member, Turkey would be unlikely to fundamentally change the 
EU and the functioning of its institutions. Turkey’s entry may 
accentuate existing divergences on the future of the integration 
process, but it would not cause a qualitative shift in the debate. It 
should be borne in mind that the decision-making process in the 
European Union is based on ever-changing alliances, and that the 
political influence of member states depends at least as much on 
economic power as on size or demographic weight. 
As far as the costs of Turkish membership are concerned, Turkey is 
likely to require financial assistance from the European Union for 
many years, the level of transfers depending on the EU’s financial 
policies and the economic situation in Turkey at the time of 
accession. 
A considerable problem could develop in several European 
countries in connection with the ratification of an accession treaty 
with Turkey, should public resistance persist and government 
policy continue to diverge from popular opinion. This issue must 
be addressed in a common effort by governments concerned, 
Turkey and the European Commission. 
The best answer to the fears in parts of Europe about Turkey’s 
different religious and cultural traditions and perceptions of a 
danger that Turkey could become a fundamentalist Muslim state is 
to ensure the continuation of the ongoing transformation process, 
and to protect Turkey’s long-standing secular political system by 
firmly anchoring Turkey in the union of European democracies. 
6 Unprecedented reform efforts undertaken by the Turkish 
Government and substantial support for EU membership in 
Turkish public opinion should not hide the enormous task that 
the ongoing and far-reaching transformation of the country’s 
legal, political and societal system represents for Turkey. It would 
be wrong to underestimate the latent resistance to such profound 
changes in many parts of Turkish society. Sustaining the reform 
process will to a large degree depend on whether the momentum of 





7 Turkey’s economy has traditionally been plagued by 
macroeconomic instability and structural deficiencies, many of 
which persist today. But the crisis of 2001 has shown the resilience 
of the Turkish economy, leading to a swift recovery and to far-
reaching reforms of the institutional and regulatory frameworks. 
It is now of vital importance that the Turkish Government persists 
with the economic reform process in close cooperation with the 
International Monetary Fund and the European Union. 
In view of the country’s size, geographic location and young and 
dynamic workforce Turkey’s economic potential is undeniable. It 
is equally evident that EU membership would be highly beneficial 
for the Turkish economy, providing a firm link to a stable system. 
The opening of accession negotiations by itself would considerably 
strengthen confidence in Turkey’s economic stability.
8 Migration pressure from Turkey, which raises concern in some 
countries, would depend on several factors, including economic 
and demographic developments in Turkey and the European 
Union. Free movement of labour is likely to apply only after a long 
transitional period, so that governments would retain control 
of immigration for many years after Turkish accession. Based 
on the experience of previous enlargement rounds, migration 
flows from Turkey are expected to be relatively modest, at a 
time when declining and aging populations may be leading to a 
serious shortage of labour in many European countries, making 
immigration vital to the continuation of present generous systems 
of social security. 
9 Turkish eligibility for EU membership having been confirmed 
on many occasions over the past decades, Turkey has every reason 
for expecting to be welcome in the Union, provided it fulfils the 
relevant conditions. The Independent Commission therefore feels 
strongly that in dealing with this issue the European Union must 
treat Turkey with all due respect, fairness and consideration.

